DAWN USD.infra vault is a Solana-based protocol that routes tokenized capital into real-world infrastructure
lending. Capital providers deposit into a Loopscale credit vault and receive vault LP shares
(sUSD.infra); positions are denominated in USD.infra, an M0 wrapped-M stablecoin on Solana's Token-2022
program. The vault, loan book, interest accrual, NAV and share price are computed on-chain by
Loopscale, where share price = strategy NAV / LP supply. An off-chain service reads the on-chain
vault state, derives the vault exchange rate, reports per-deal collateral valuations to Loopscale,
and publishes that exchange rate on-chain — with additional growth sanity checks — for downstream
oracle consumption.
PoC Required
Select the category you'd like to explore
Assets in Scope
Impacts in Scope
Unintended alteration of what the NFT represents (e.g. token URI, payload, artistic content)
Manipulation of governance voting result deviating from voted outcome and resulting in a direct change from intended effect of original results
Execute arbitrary system commands
Retrieve sensitive data/files from a running server, such as:
- /etc/shadow
- database passwords
- blockchain keys (this does not include non-sensitive environment variables, open source code, or usernames)
Taking down the application/website
Taking down the NFT URI
Taking and/modifying authenticated actions (with or without blockchain state interaction) on behalf of other users without any interaction by that user, such as:
- Changing registration information
- Commenting
- Voting
- Making trades
- Withdrawals, etc.
Changing NFT metadata
Subdomain takeover with already-connected wallet interaction
Direct theft of user funds
Malicious interactions with an already-connected wallet, such as:
- Modifying transaction arguments or parameters
- Substituting contract addresses
- Submitting malicious transactions
Direct theft of user NFTs
Out of scope
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Upstream / third-party program code: the M0 wrapped-M / Token-2022 program internals (only USD.infra mint configuration and pause-authority operation are in scope); and the Loopscale credit-vault program, its vault/loan/NAV/share-price primitives, and its oracle keeper, authored and operated by Loopscale (only InfraFi's vault configuration and integration are in scope). Also excludes Squads V4, Pyth/Chainlink, wallet libraries (reown/AppKit), and all npm/cargo dependencies.
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Off-chain internal services (infrafi-manager, indexer) and anything behind the WireGuard VPN, except as reachable via the public web/API assets.
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Known issues listed
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Findings requiring compromise of an operator's machine, Slack workspace account, hardware wallet, or multisig/Squads signer key, or of Loopscale's protocol-admin co-signer (assumed-trusted operators and counterparty).
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Debug-build-only behavior (e.g. the in-process change-request auto-apply path); production ships
--release. -
NAV read staleness within the documented snapshot window (historical NAV is served from local snapshots), and fee-accrual / share-price drift within the documented conservation tolerance.
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Best-practice / missing-hardening reports with no demonstrated exploit; and standard web boilerplate (missing security headers, CSRF on unauthenticated reads, self-XSS, clickjacking on stateless pages, SPF/DKIM, rate-limiting on public reads, automated-scanner output).
infrafi-manager & api.infrastructure.finance — admin surface
Out of scope:
The VPN-gated admin/manager surface (infrafi-manager) and all authenticated/admin API routes — including /admin/*, project/building mutations, valuation posting, borrow/repay proposals, and the /slack/interactive callback — when performed by a trusted operator acting within the four-eyes approval flow and the post-time delta bounds.
In scope:
The public, unauthenticated read routes of api.infrastructure.finance. Any bug that bypasses the four-eyes approval or the post-time delta bounds. Any path that lets deal valuations (or borrow/repay / mutations) be executed or manipulated without the trusted-operator role.
Program Rules — Relationship to Loopscale's Bug Bounty Program
InfraFi's credit vault runs on Loopscale's on-chain program, which is covered by Loopscale's own bug bounty program. Vulnerabilities in the Loopscale protocol, program, vault primitives, oracle keeper, or any Loopscale-operated infrastructure are out of scope here and must be reported to Loopscale. Only DAWN / InfraFi's own vault configuration and integration — as defined under Assets in Scope — are eligible under this program.
No double payment. A report describing the same underlying vulnerability (same root cause) that is eligible for, has been submitted to, or has been rewarded by Loopscale's bug bounty program will not receive a separate reward from InfraFi. Where a single issue touches both programs, the researcher may be compensated under one program only; InfraFi will coordinate with Loopscale on attribution and will not duplicate a bounty already paid or payable by Loopscale for the same root cause. Deliberately submitting the same finding to both programs to obtain two payouts is considered abuse and may result in disqualification.
Smart Contract specific
- Incorrect data supplied by third party oracles
- Not to exclude oracle manipulation/flash loan attacks
- Impacts requiring basic economic and governance attacks (e.g. 51% attack)
- Lack of liquidity impacts
- Impacts from Sybil attacks
- Impacts involving centralization risks
All categories
- Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
- Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
- Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
- Best practice recommendations
- Feature requests
- Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
- Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers