Audit Comp | Firelight-logo

Audit Comp | Firelight

|

The Firelight Vault is an upgradeable ERC‑4626 compatible vault with additional features.

Solidity

Live

9d: 11h remaining
Primary Pool
$10,500
All Stars Pool
$3,000
Podium Pool
$1,500
Start Date
07 November 2025
End Date
17 November 2025
Rewards Token
USDC
Lines of Code
528
  • Triaged by Immunefi

  • Step-by-step PoC Required

Select the category you'd like to explore

Assets in Scope

Target
Type
Smart Contract - FirelightVault.sol - Upgradeable ERC4626-compatible vault - [500]
Added on
7 November 2025
Target
Type
Smart Contract - FirelightVaultStorage.sol - Storage layout for FirelightVault- [28]
Added on
7 November 2025

Impacts in Scope

Build Commands, Test Commands, and How to Run Them

Installation: git clone https://github.com/firelight-protocol/firelight-core.git cd firelight-core npm install Create your .env file using .env.sample as a reference.

Run tests: npx hardhat test

Optional: For faster test execution, comment out the forking configuration on line 29 of hardhat.config.js.

Asset Accuracy Assurance

Bugs found on assets incorrectly listed in-scope are valid.

Code Freeze Assurance

Code of the assets in scope is frozen while the program is live.

Duplicate submissions of bugs are valid. Duplicate submissions of Insights are invalid.

The project commits to keeping all info related to bug findings private until this program is over. This means the project will not leak info about any bug findings or planned bug fixes, including bug findings found independently by the project or from concurrent private audits.


Previous Audits

Firelight’s completed audit reports can be found at https://firelight.finance/audit.pdf. Unfixed vulnerabilities mentioned in these reports are not eligible for a reward.

Public Disclosure of Known Issues

Bug reports for publicly disclosed bugs are not eligible for a reward.

Inflation attack: This is a known issue with ERC-4626 described at https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/5.x/erc4626#security-concern-inflation-attack We'll take care of this at the time of deployment.

Private Known Issues Reward Policy

Private known issues, meaning known issues that were not publicly disclosed, are valid for a reward.


Where might Security Researchers confuse out-of-scope code to be in-scope? There should be no confusion. Only one smart contract and its storage contract are in scope.

Is this an upgrade of an existing system? If so, which? And what are the main differences?

No, this is not an upgrade of an existing system and will be a first-time deployment.

Where do you suspect there may be bugs and/or what attack vectors are you most concerned about?

Overall security and correctness are especially important.

What ERC20 / ERC721 / ERC777 / ERC1155 token standards are supported?

The vault is ERC-4626 compliant and holds/transfers ERC-20 tokens. No ERC-721, ERC-777, or ERC-1155 tokens are supported.

What emergency actions may you want to use as a reason to downgrade an otherwise valid bug report?

None. We do not use emergency actions as a basis to downgrade severity.

What addresses would you consider any bug report requiring their involvement to be out of scope, as long as they operate within the privileges attributed to them?

The role-based administrative addresses are considered trusted.These roles are intentionally authorized to modify configurations or perform emergency actions. Their intended permissions are not considered vulnerabilities. This includes: DEPOSIT_LIMIT_UPDATE_ROLE, RESCUER_ROLE, BLOCKLIST_ROLE, PAUSE_ROLE, PERIOD_CONFIGURATION_UPDATE_ROLE

What addresses would you consider any bug report requiring their involvement be out of scope, even if they exceed the privileges attributed to them? None.

Which chains and/or networks will the code in scope be deployed to?

Flare Network. https://flare-explorer.flare.network/

What external dependencies are there? There are no external dependencies. The system does not rely on oracles, price feeds, or external protocol integrations.

Are there any unusual points about your protocol that may confuse Security Researchers?

We do not think so. The time-based period configuration may be slightly unusual, but the implementation is straightforward and self-explanatory in the code.

What are the most valuable educational resources already available? (Ie. Documentation, Explainer videos or articles, etc)

https://github.com/firelight-protocol/firelight-core/blob/main/README.md

Severity
Critical
Title

Manipulation of governance voting result deviating from voted outcome and resulting in a direct change from intended effect of original results

Severity
Critical
Title

Direct theft of any user NFTs, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed royalties

Severity
Critical
Title

Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield

Severity
Critical
Title

Permanent freezing of funds

Severity
Critical
Title

Permanent freezing of NFTs

Severity
Critical
Title

Unauthorized minting of NFTs

Severity
Critical
Title

Predictable or manipulable RNG that results in abuse of the principal or NFT

Severity
Critical
Title

Unintended alteration of what the NFT represents (e.g. token URI, payload, artistic content)

Severity
Critical
Title

Protocol insolvency

Severity
High
Title

Theft of unclaimed yield

Severity
High
Title

Theft of unclaimed royalties

Severity
High
Title

Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield

Out of scope

Default Out of Scope and rules

Smart Contract specific

  • Incorrect data supplied by third party oracles
    • Not to exclude oracle manipulation/flash loan attacks
  • Impacts requiring basic economic and governance attacks (e.g. 51% attack)
  • Lack of liquidity impacts
  • Impacts from Sybil attacks
  • Impacts involving centralization risks

All categories

  • Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
  • Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
  • Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
  • Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
  • Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
  • Best practice recommendations
  • Feature requests
  • Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
  • Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers