Flare is the blockchain for data. It is a layer-1, EVM smart contract platform designed to expand the utility of blockchain by delivering data certainty for dApp builders.
FAssets is a trustless, over-collateralized bridge built on Flare that connects non smart contract networks to Flare/Songbird. It enables the creation of wrapped tokens (FAssets) for assets like BTC, DOGE and XRP.
At the core of FAssets v1.1 is a new architecture component called the Core Vault, designed to improve system liquidity, scalability, and capital efficiency.
Live
Triaged by Immunefi
Step-by-step PoC Required
Select the category you'd like to explore
Assets in Scope
Impacts in Scope
Build commands, Test commands, and instructions on how to run them:
- Instructions on how to start the project: https://github.com/flare-labs-ltd/fassets?tab=readme-ov-file#getting-started. The easiest way is to add code in unit tests because the functionality on which the project relates is mocked.
- Look at https://github.com/flare-labs-ltd/fassets/blob/main/test/integration/fasset-simulation/AttackScenarios.ts where researchers have submitted their reports.
- Information and some guides can also be found on Flare Dev Hub: https://dev.flare.network/fassets/overview
What ERC20 / ERC721 / ERC777 / ERC1155 token standards are supported? Which are not?
- Only ERC20 for FAsset implementation
Which chains and/or networks will the code in scope be deployed to?
- Coston (testnet), Coston2 (testnet), Songbird, Flare
Is this an upgrade of an existing system? If so, which? And what are the main differences?
- The project is an upgrade of FAssets V1. The new functionality is centered around the core vault, exposed in the
CoreVaultFacet.sol
Where do you suspect there may be bugs?
- Those interacting with new Core Vault features.
What external dependencies are there?
- FDC (Flare Data Connector), FTSO-V2 (Flare Time Series Oracle)
Where might Security Researchers confuse out-of-scope code to be in-scope?
- The FAssets system is able to support wrapped tokens for XRP, BTC and DOGE. However, the initial v1.1 deployment will only have XRP (FXRP) enabled and that will be the sole scope of this audit competition. Any attacks related to FBTC, FDOGE, or UTXO-based logic in general, are out of scope.
- handshake-based functionalities based on a non-zero
handshakeTypesetting are also out of scope. - Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to an Agent role without additional modifications to the privileges attributed are open to be downgraded by one level of severity (e.g. from Critical to High)
What addresses would you consider any bug report requiring their involvement to be out of scope, as long as they operate within the privileges attributed to them?
- governance, core vault multisig
What addresses would you consider any bug report requiring their involvement be out of scope, even if they exceed the privileges attributed to them?
- governance (hard to exceed the privileges, as they can update the contracts)
Previous Audits
- Flare Network’s completed audit reports can be found at https://dev.flare.network/support/audits/. Unfixed vulnerabilities mentioned in these reports are not eligible for a reward.
Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Permanent freezing of funds
Protocol insolvency
Theft of unclaimed yield
Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield
Temporary freezing of funds
Temporary freezing of funds for at least 24 hour
Smart contract unable to operate due to lack of token funds
Block stuffing
Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)
Unbounded gas consumption
Temporary freezing of funds for at least 1 hour
Out of scope
- The FAssets system is able to support wrapped tokens for XRP, BTC and DOGE. However, the initial v1.1 deployment will only have XRP (FXRP) enabled and that will be the sole scope of this audit competition. Any attacks related to FBTC, FDOGE, or UTXO-based logic in general, are out of scope.
- handshake-based functionalities based on a non-zero
handshakeTypesetting are also out of scope. - Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to an Agent role without additional modifications to the privileges attributed are open to be downgraded by one level of severity (e.g. from Critical to High)
Smart Contract specific
- Incorrect data supplied by third party oracles
- Not to exclude oracle manipulation/flash loan attacks
- Impacts requiring basic economic and governance attacks (e.g. 51% attack)
- Lack of liquidity impacts
- Impacts from Sybil attacks
- Impacts involving centralization risks
All categories
- Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
- Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
- Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
- Best practice recommendations
- Feature requests
- Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
- Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers