Audit Comp | Folks: Liquid Staking-logo

Audit Comp | Folks: Liquid Staking

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Evaluating

25d: 8h remaining
Rewards Pool
$30,000
Vault TVL
To be determined
Started
09 December 2024
Ended
19 December 2024
Rewards Token
USDC
nSLOC
651
  • Triaged by Immunefi

  • PoC required

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Assets in Scope

Target
Type
Smart Contract - ConsensusV2 [651]
Added on
9 December 2024

Impacts in Scope

Proof of Concept (PoC) Requirements

A PoC, demonstrating the bug's impact, is required for this program and has to comply with the Immunefi PoC Guidelines and Rules.

Whitehat Educational Resources & Technical Info

What ERC20 / ERC721 / ERC777 / ERC1155 token standards are supported? Which are not?

Algorand has native support for tokens with ASAs (Algorand Standard Assets). The liquid staking token which is distributed is an Algorand ASA.

What emergency actions may you want to use as a reason to invalidate or downgrade an otherwise valid bug report?

We can update the deployed application in an emergency so some issues e.g. freezing of funds, may be mitigated from a permanent issue to a temporary issue. We also have the ability to pause immediate and/or delayed minting.

What monitoring systems may you want to use as a reason to invalidate or downgrade an otherwise valid bug report?

None

What addresses would you consider any bug report requiring their involvement to be out of scope, as long as they operate within the privileges attributed to them?

The four admins:

  • The “admin” which is the super admin.
  • The “register_admin” which can add proposers, set the proposer admin and register a proposer offline.
  • The “xgov_admin” which can subscribe and unsubscribe proposers to xgov.
  • The “proposer_admin” which can register a proposer online and offline.

What addresses would you consider any bug report requiring their involvement be out of scope, even if they exceed the privileges attributed to them?

None

Security Researcher Education

Project educational resources

Is this an upgrade of an existing system? If so, which? And what are the main differences?

Yes it is an upgrade of the old version of ALGO Liquid Staking deployed at https://lora.algokit.io/mainnet/application/1134695678. The main differences are:

  • Support for subscribing and unsubscribing from the xGov program.
  • Support for 3rd party node runners where now each proposer has its own admin which can register it online and offline.
  • The smart contract enforces the splitting of stake between the proposers.
  • Removed “min_proposer_balance” checks.

Note that the existing state of the smart contract will persist after the update (global/local state and box storage).

Where do you suspect there may be bugs?

The calculations for “immediate_mint”, “delayed_mint”, “claim_delayed_mint” and “burn” cannot be manipulated. In addition, the smart contract should enforce an approximate equal stake split between the proposers.

You should also check privileged operations are safely guarded.

What external dependencies are there?

The main external dependency is the Algorand Consensus participation. Each proposers; participation keys will reside on its own Algorand Node and will receive ALGO rewards each time it proposes a block.

Another external dependency is the xGov program. The xGov power is given to block proposers and the smart contract allows delegating the control of the votes to an external address supplied by the “xgov_admin”.

Lastly some of the proposers’ Algorand Nodes may be run by trusted projects and/or key community members.

Are there any unusual points about your protocol that may confuse Security Researchers?

The smart contract is an update of an existing smart contract which is already deployed on mainnet. Therefore there is no application create call supported. In addition you should consider the existing state of the smart contract https://lora.algokit.io/mainnet/application/1134695678 (global/local state and box storage) as these will persist between updates. The accompanying Design Overview Document provides further details on this.

When an account is marked online/offline, the moment a key registration transaction is confirmed by the network it takes 320 rounds for the change to take effect. So, if a key registration is confirmed in round 5000, the account will stop participating at round 5320.

The same applies for changes in stake.

Severity
Critical
Title

Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield

Severity
Critical
Title

Permanent freezing of funds

Severity
Critical
Title

Protocol insolvency

Severity
High
Title

Theft of unclaimed yield

Severity
High
Title

Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield

Severity
High
Title

Temporary freezing of funds for at least 1 hour

Severity
Medium
Title

Smart contract unable to operate due to lack of token funds

Severity
Medium
Title

Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)

Severity
Low
Title

Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value

Out of scope

Default Out of Scope and rules

Smart Contract specific

  • Incorrect data supplied by third party oracles
    • Not to exclude oracle manipulation/flash loan attacks
  • Impacts requiring basic economic and governance attacks (e.g. 51% attack)
  • Lack of liquidity impacts
  • Impacts from Sybil attacks
  • Impacts involving centralization risks

All categories

  • Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
  • Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
  • Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
  • Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
  • Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
  • Best practice recommendations
  • Feature requests
  • Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
  • Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers