Starknet Staking
Staking on Starknet involves locking STRK tokens in the staking protocol, in order to contribute to network security and performance. Users can either stake directly or delegate their tokens to others, with staking rewards based on their level of participation and contribution.
PoC required
KYC required
Rewards
Rewards by Threat Level
Mainnet assets:
Reward amount is 10% of the funds directly affected up to a maximum of:
$40,000Payouts are handled by the StarkWare team directly and are denominated in USD. However, payments are done in USDC or STRK, at StarkWare’s discretion.
The calculation of the net amount rewarded is based on the average price between CoinMarketCap.com and CoinGecko.com at the time the bug report was submitted. No adjustments are made based on liquidity availability.
Program Overview
Staking on Starknet involves locking STRK tokens in the staking protocol, in order to contribute to network security and performance. Users can either stake directly or delegate their tokens to others, with staking rewards based on their level of participation and contribution.
For more information about Starknet Staking, please visit https://docs.starknet.io/staking/overview/
StarkWare provides rewards in USDC or STRK, denominated in USD, at its discretion. For more details about the payment process, please view the Rewards by Threat Level section further below.
Public Disclosure of Known Issues
- Bug reports covering previously-discovered bugs (listed below) are not eligible for a reward within this program. This includes known issues that the project is aware of but has consciously decided not to “fix”, necessary code changes, or any implemented operational mitigating procedures that can lessen potential risk.
- The reward calculation using a round-up/down in compute_commission_amount_rounded_down and compute_commission_amount_rounded_up under utils.cairo
- There is a set_reward_supplier function in addition to having it in the consructor. This is a non-issue.
- The used token is STRK and is trusted, reentrency vulnerabilities regarding the token are a non-issue
- All relevant contracts, i.e. Staking, RewardSupplier, MintingCurve, Pool contracts, are all ours and trusted. Reentrency vulnerabilities in interactions between these contracts (again, including all different pool instances), are a non-issue.
- In case of commision change on stakers, pool members will not get the updated comission automatically. All issues regarding this phenomenon are known.
- Users can not switch out of finalized pool if they hadn’t made an exit intent prior to the staker’s unstake_action.
- In PeriodMintLimit.sol the periodic mint cap is an interval (and not sliding window), and is reset on timestamp rounded week, so potentially someone can mint double the mint cap in 2 seconds (the one before end of week, and one after). This is a non-issue.
- Out of order messages to
update_total_supplyare a non-issue.
KYC required
The submission of KYC information is a requirement for payout processing.
Proof of Concept
Proof of concept is always required for all severities.
Responsible Publication
Category 3: Approval Required
Prohibited Activities
- Any testing on mainnet or public testnet deployed code; all testing should be done on local-forks of either public testnet or mainnet
- Any testing with pricing oracles or third-party smart contracts
- Attempting phishing or other social engineering attacks against our employees and/or customers
- Any testing with third-party systems and applications (e.g. browser extensions) as well as websites (e.g. SSO providers, advertising networks)
- Any denial of service attacks that are executed against project assets
- Automated testing of services that generates significant amounts of traffic
- Public disclosure of an unpatched vulnerability in an embargoed bounty
- Any other actions prohibited by the Immunefi Rules
Feasibility Limitations
The project may be receiving reports that are valid (the bug and attack vector are real) and cite assets and impacts that are in scope, but there may be obstacles or barriers to executing the attack in the real world. In other words, there is a question about how feasible the attack really is. Conversely, there may also be mitigation measures that projects can take to prevent the impact of the bug, which are not feasible or would require unconventional action and hence, should not be used as reasons for downgrading a bug's severity.
Therefore, Immunefi has developed a set of feasibility limitation standards which by default states what security researchers, as well as projects, can or cannot cite when reviewing a bug report.