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Arbitrum

Arbitrum is a suite of scaling solutions for Ethereum developed by Offchain Labs that drastically reduces costs and latency. Arbitrum One is an "Optimistic Rollup", which instantly scales apps, reducing costs and increasing capacity, without sacrificing Ethereum's security. Arbitrum validators optimistically post updates to Ethereum, and the protocol uses an interactive fraud proof mechanism to resolve any disputes efficiently with a minimal on-chain footprint.

Arbitrum
ETH
Blockchain
L2
Solidity
Maximum Bounty
$2,000,000
Live Since
31 August 2021
Last Updated
30 July 2026
  • PoC Required

  • KYC required

Select the category you'd like to explore

Assets in Scope

Target
Name
IArbToken.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L2ArbitrumMessenger.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
StandardArbERC20.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L2ArbitrumGateway.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L2CustomGateway.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L2ERC20Gateway.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L2GatewayRouter.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L2WethGateway.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
ICustomToken.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L1ArbitrumMessenger.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L1ArbitrumExtendedGateway.sol
Added on
10 May 2022
Target
Name
L1ArbitrumGateway.sol
Added on
10 May 2022

Impacts in Scope

Impacts Body

In addition to the versions of these smart contracts on GitHub, this bug bounty also covers the deployments of these contracts presently in use by the Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova networks to the extent that any vulnerability impacts said networks (e.g. if only Arbitrum One's deployment had out of date vulnerable code relating to the Data Availability Service which is not enabled on Arbitrum One and this made the vulnerability unusable to harm Arbitrum One, it would not be in scope). This bug bounty also covers any upgrades to those in scope deployments which have been scheduled by a passed on-chain constitutional DAO vote or the non-emergency security council multisig, as long as that action is currently waiting in the L2 governance timelock, the bridge to L1, or the L1 governance timelock (i.e. it has passed and is set to go through, and has not been canceled).

Severity
Critical
Title

Direct theft of user funds that is NOT mitigiated by a protocol-enforced delay

Severity
Critical
Title

Permanent freezing of funds (cannot be fixed by upgrade)

Severity
High
Title

Incorrectly confirmed assertion / incorrectly resolved BoLD challenge, NOT detected by honest validators, that allows proving an invalid withdrawal

Severity
High
Title

Direct theft or permanent freezing of user funds that IS mitigated by a protocol-enforced delay

Severity
High
Title

Insolvency

Severity
High
Title

Permanent freezing of funds (can be fixed by upgrade)

Severity
High
Title

Bugs relating to reorgs

Severity
High
Title

Damage relating to withdrawing funds via fast bridges

Severity
High
Title

Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks that cause network-wide outages (attacks that only take down the RPC do not count)

Severity
Medium
Title

Incorrectly resolved BoLD challenge that is detected by honest validators, or that does not allow proving an invalid withdrawal

Severity
Medium
Title

Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)

Severity
Medium
Title

Theft of gas

Out of scope

Program's Out of Scope information

Out of Scope and Rules

Smart Contract specific

  • Incorrect data supplied by third party oracles
  • Not to exclude oracle manipulation/flash loan attacks
  • Impacts requiring basic economic and governance attacks (e.g. 51% attack)
  • Lack of liquidity impacts
  • Impacts from Sybil attacks
  • Impacts involving centralization risks

All categories

  • Impacts only reachable under a non-default node or chain configuration, or in a feature not currently enabled on Arbitrum One or Arbitrum Nova
  • Impacts that only manifest during a node-software upgrade/rollout window, historical block replay, or archive/from-genesis sync, and do not affect the live canonical chain
  • Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
  • Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
  • Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses/roles (including, but not limited to: governance, sequencer, batch poster and feed relays and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
  • Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
  • Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
  • Best practice recommendations
  • Feature requests
  • Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
  • Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers
  • Impacts affecting only validator/assertion stakes, challenge bonds, or protocol fee accounts (theft, loss, or freezing) — these funds are excluded from the user-fund impact tiers

Informational

  • Changes or bugs found or related to Tutorials maintained by Offchain Labs
  • Changes or bugs regarding the arbitrum-sdk
  • Inconsistencies found between documentation and smart contracts and other blockchain code
  • Best practice critiques
  • Denial of Service (DoS) Attacks that only affects some nodes, or cause only some nodes to crash
  • Problems caused by L1 Gas Pricing
  • Issues that affect geth and are not caused by changes made in the Nitro implementation
  • Issues that affect Arbitrum One and Arbitrum Nova will be treated as a single issue, and a report of the same issue with the only difference being the network will be treated as a duplicate.