Ether.fi
ether.fi ~ DefiBank
ether.fi is building the future of decentralized financial banking through innovative staking solutions, automated DeFi strategies, and secure financial primitives.
🌊 Liquid Re-Staking
- Efficient ETH staking with automated staking and restaking management
- Most widely adopted liquid staking solution in the DeFi ecosystem
- Strictly controlled AVS Restaking by Protocol Security through - comprehensive audits and formal verification
- Seamless Cross-chain bridge support
💳 Cash
-Credit Card powered by ether.fi's non-custodial solution featuring:
- Key management via secure enclave architecture through TEE
- Universal cross-chain addressing for the best on-ramp experience
- Modular security design with role-based access control
- Seamless DeFi banking experience
- Advanced hook system for transaction
Triaged by Immunefi
PoC Required
KYC required
Select the category you'd like to explore
Assets in Scope
Impacts in Scope
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Impacts that require a compromised or malicious privileged role (owner, admin, multisig signer, oracle committee member, node operator with trusted permissions, or pauser) are out of scope unless the vulnerability allows an unprivileged attacker to obtain that role." Without this, every "what if the admin key is stolen" report claims critical
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Freezing is 'permanent' only if funds/NFTs cannot be recovered through any existing mechanism, including contract upgrade, admin/governance action, or pausing and migration. If recovery is possible via privileged action, the impact is classified as temporary freezing at most.
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Temporary freezing requires funds to be inaccessible for a minimum of 10 days with no user-side workaround. Delays shorter than this, or freezes resolvable by the user via an alternate path out of scope.
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Direct theft means the attacker obtains custody or irrevocable claim over assets. Indirect value loss - including price impact on eETH/weETH, depeg of underlying assets, slashing events on EigenLayer, or losses originating in integrated third-party protocols - is not direct theft."
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Vulnerabilities whose root cause lies in third-party infrastructure or protocols (EigenLayer contracts, oracle providers, bridges, RPC providers, wallets) are out of scope. Only vulnerabilities in code within the listed assets qualify.
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Critical and High severity require a runnable proof of concept against a mainnet fork. Rewards for fund-theft impacts are capped at 5% of demonstrably at-risk funds, valued at time of report. Theoretical impact without a realistic execution path is downgraded." Also require that the researcher has not executed the attack on mainnet.
Protocol permanent insolvency
Retrieve sensitive data/files from a running server, such as: /etc/shadow, database passwords, blockchain keys (this does not include non-sensitive environment variables, open source code, or usernames)
Taking state-modifying authenticated actions (with or without blockchain state interaction) on behalf of other users without any interaction by that user, such as: Changing registration information, Commenting, Voting, Making trades, Withdrawals, etc.
Malicious interactions with an already-connected wallet, such as: Modifying transaction arguments or parameters, Substituting contract addresses, Submitting malicious transactions
Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Direct theft of any user NFTs, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed royalties
Permanent freezing of funds
Unauthorized minting of NFTs
Protocol insolvency
Execute arbitrary system commands
Taking down the application/website
Subdomain takeover with already-connected wallet interaction
Out of scope
- Issues that are discovered by the previous audits
- Anything related to the ether.fan project.
Smart Contract specific
- Incorrect data supplied by third party oracles
- Not to exclude oracle manipulation/flash loan attacks
- Impacts requiring basic economic and governance attacks (e.g. 51% attack)
- Lack of liquidity impacts
- Impacts from Sybil attacks
- Impacts involving centralization risks
All categories
- Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
- Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
- Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
- Best practice recommendations
- Feature requests
- Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
- Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers