The Ostium Protocol is an open-sourced, decentralised exchange on Ethereum Layer 2 Arbitrum, enabling transparent and non-custodial perpetuals exposure to Real World Assets. Ostium is customized to support fractional onchain trading of assets like gold, oil, S&P, JPY and other traditional markets from a crypto wallet.
Arbitrum
Exchange
Defi
Perpetuals
DEX
NextJS
Solidity
Typescript
Maximum Bounty
$200,000Live Since
30 April 2025Last Updated
08 April 2026Triaged by Immunefi
PoC Required
KYC required
Select the category you'd like to explore
Assets in Scope
Target
Primacy Of Impact
Name
Added on
6 February 2026
Target
Primacy Of Impact
Name
Added on
16 March 2026
Impacts in Scope
Severity
Critical
Title
Execution of trades at incorrect prices through validation bypass
Severity
Critical
Title
Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Severity
Critical
Title
Direct theft of any user NFTs, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed royalties
Severity
Critical
Title
Permanent freezing of funds
Severity
Critical
Title
Permanent freezing of NFTs
Severity
Critical
Title
Unauthorized minting of NFTs
Severity
Critical
Title
Protocol insolvency
Severity
Critical
Title
Execute arbitrary system commands
Severity
Critical
Title
Retrieve sensitive data/files from a running server, such as:
- /etc/shadow
- database passwords
- blockchain keys (this does not include non-sensitive environment variables, open source code, or usernames)
Severity
Critical
Title
Taking down the application/website
Severity
Critical
Title
Taking and/modifying authenticated actions (with or without blockchain state interaction) on behalf of other users without any interaction by that user, such as:
- Changing registration information
- Commenting
- Voting
- Making trades
- Withdrawals, etc.
Severity
Critical
Title
Subdomain takeover with already-connected wallet interaction
Out of scope
Program's Out of Scope information
Privileged Roles & Admin Actions
- All privileged role actions (gov, dev, manager, owner etc) are assumed to be performed correctly and in good faith. Issues arising from admin misconfiguration, incorrect parameter setting, or misuse of privileged functions are out of scope.
- Contract upgradeability via proxy admin is a known trust assumption. Findings related to the ability of the proxy admin to upgrade contracts are out of scope.
- Gov-controlled fee and parameter changes are by design. The gov role can adjust trading fees, funding rates, rollover fees, leverage limits, vault settlement parameters, and spread parameters. Reports about the gov role having this power are not valid findings.
- Dev fee claims will not drain protocol funds. It is assumed that the dev role will only claim correct amount of fees, not create scenarios where fee withdrawal impacts the rest of the protocol.
- Pause and kill-switch mechanisms are intentional. The manager can pause trading and the gov can trigger the done() kill-switch. Reports about these capabilities existing are not valid findings.
- Timelock delays are a known trade-off. Issues related to governance actions being delayed by the timelock are by design.
Keepers & Oracles
- All registered keepers (PriceUpKeep, PrivatePriceUpKeep, TradesUpKeep) and their forwarders are assumed to be trusted and operating correctly. Issues requiring a compromised or malicious keeper are out of scope.
- Price feeds (Chainlink and custom OstiumVerifier signers) are assumed to deliver accurate data. Oracle manipulation at the source (e.g., compromising Chainlink nodes or authorized signers) is out of scope. However, improper validation or handling of price data within the protocol contracts is in scope.
- Price staleness within the configured maxTsValidity window is expected behavior. Reports about price data being slightly delayed within the allowed validity window are not valid findings.
Economic & Griefing Thresholds
- Griefing attacks that require significant capital (>$10,000) with no monetary gain to the attacker are out of scope or will be downgraded at protocol discretion. The protocol reserves the right to evaluate the practical feasibility and real-world impact of any griefing submission.
- Attacks that require sustained, economically irrational behavior over multiple blocks or transactions to achieve minimal impact are out of scope.
- Theoretical insolvency scenarios that require extreme and unrealistic market conditions (e.g., all pairs simultaneously hitting max leverage liquidation thresholds) are out of scope or may be downgraded at protocol discretion.
External Dependencies & Integrations
- Issues in third-party contracts (OpenZeppelin, Chainlink, Gelato) are out of scope unless the finding demonstrates that the protocol incorrectly integrates or uses these dependencies.
- Arbitrum L2 sequencer behavior, downtime, or reorgs are out of scope. The protocol operates on Arbitrum and inherits its security properties. Findings that rely on L2 sequencer manipulation or downtime as an attack vector are not valid.
- ERC-20 token behavior of USDC is assumed to be standard. Issues related to USDC blacklisting, upgradeability, or depegging are out of scope.
General Exclusions
- Front-running of governance/admin transactions is out of scope. Privileged operations are protected by timelocks and trusted execution.
- Known gas inefficiencies in gov-only or manager-only batch functions (e.g., registerContracts, updateContracts) are out of scope. These are called infrequently by trusted roles who can manage gas limits.
- Findings based on deprecated or dead code paths scheduled for removal in the next upgrade are out of scope unless they can be exploited in the current deployed state.
- Loss-of-precision issues that result in insignificant rounding differences are out of scope.
- Best practice recommendations, gas optimizations, and informational findings without a demonstrated impact are out of scope.
Default Out of Scope and rules
Web & App specific
- Theoretical impacts without any proof or demonstration
- Impacts involving attacks requiring physical access to the victim device
- Impacts involving attacks requiring access to the local network of the victim
- Reflected plain text injection (e.g. url parameters, path, etc.)
- This does not exclude reflected HTML injection with or without JavaScript
- This does not exclude persistent plain text injection
- Any impacts involving self-XSS
- Captcha bypass using OCR without impact demonstration
- CSRF with no state modifying security impact (e.g. logout CSRF)
- Impacts related to missing HTTP Security Headers (such as X-FRAME-OPTIONS) or cookie security flags (such as “httponly”) without demonstration of impact
- Server-side non-confidential information disclosure, such as IPs, server names, and most stack traces
- Impacts causing only the enumeration or confirmation of the existence of users or tenants
- Impacts caused by vulnerabilities requiring un-prompted, in-app user actions that are not part of the normal app workflows
- Lack of SSL/TLS best practices
- Impacts that only require DDoS
- UX and UI impacts that do not materially disrupt use of the platform
- Impacts primarily caused by browser/plugin defects
- Leakage of non sensitive API keys (e.g. Etherscan, Infura, Alchemy, etc.)
- Any vulnerability exploit requiring browser bugs for exploitation (e.g. CSP bypass)
- SPF/DMARC misconfigured records)
- Missing HTTP Headers without demonstrated impact
- Automated scanner reports without demonstrated impact
- UI/UX best practice recommendations
- Non-future-proof NFT rendering
All categories
- Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
- Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
- Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
- Best practice recommendations
- Feature requests
- Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
- Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers