Protocol V3 - PRL - PeripheralMigrationContract

Protocol V3 - Core Protocol - ParallelAccessManager

Protocol V3 - Flashloan Module - FlashParallelToken

Protocol V3 - Bridging Module - BridgeableTokenP

Protocol V3 - Flashloan Module - FlashParallel

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - RewardHandler

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - DiamondCut

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - Redeemer

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - SettersGuardian

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - SettersGovernor

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - ParallelizerUSDp

Protocol V3 - Savings Module - SavingsNameable

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - Swapper

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - Getters

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - DiamondLoupe

Protocol V3 - Parallelizer Module - GenericHarvester

Protocol V3 - PRL - RewardMerkleDistributor

Parallel is a capital-efficient, modular stablecoins protocol that allows the creation of over-collateralized, decentralized stablecoins. The protocol consists of several different modules, which can be added or removed over time by the DAO, from which stablecoins can be issued or minted.

Manipulation of governance voting result deviating from voted outcome and resulting in a direct change from intended effect of original results

Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield

Permanent freezing of funds

Protocol insolvency

Theft of unclaimed yield

Theft of unclaimed royalties

Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield

Temporary freezing of funds

Smart contract unable to operate due to lack of token funds

Block stuffing

Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)

Unbounded gas consumption

Contract fails to deliver promised returns, but doesn't lose value

Execute arbitrary system commands

Retrieve sensitive data/files from a running server, such as:
- /etc/shadow
- database passwords
- blockchain keys (this does not include non-sensitive environment variables, open source code, or usernames)

Taking down the application/website

Taking and/modifying authenticated actions (with or without blockchain state interaction) on behalf of other users without any interaction by that user, such as:
- Changing registration information
- Commenting
- Voting
- Making trades
- Withdrawals, etc.

Subdomain takeover with already-connected wallet interaction

Direct theft of user funds

Malicious interactions with an already-connected wallet, such as:
- Modifying transaction arguments or parameters
- Substituting contract addresses
- Submitting malicious transactions

Injection of malicious HTML or XSS through metadata

Injecting/modifying the static content on the target application without JavaScript (persistent), such as:
- HTML injection without JavaScript
- Replacing existing text with arbitrary text
- Arbitrary file uploads, etc.

Changing sensitive details of other users (including modifying browser local storage) without already-connected wallet interaction and with up to one click of user interaction, such as:
- Email
- Password of the victim etc.

Improperly disclosing confidential user information, such as:
- Email address
- Phone number
- Physical address, etc.

Subdomain takeover without already-connected wallet interaction

Changing non-sensitive details of other users (including modifying browser local storage) without already-connected wallet interaction and with up to one click of user interaction, such as:
- Changing the first/last name of user
- Enabling/disabling notifications

Injecting/modifying the static content on the target application without JavaScript (reflected), such as:
- Reflected HTML Injection
- Loading external site data

Redirecting users to malicious websites (open redirect)

Changing details of other users (including modifying browser local storage) without already-connected wallet interaction and with significant user interaction, such as:
- Iframing leading to modifying the backend/browser state (must demonstrate impact with PoC)

Taking over broken or expired outgoing links, such as:
- Social media handles, etc.

Temporarily disabling user to access target site, such as:
- Locking up the victim from login
- Cookie bombing, etc.

parallel-parallelizer/Savings.sol : Bad governance settings can lead to loss/under-collateralization.

parallel-parallelizer/Savings.sol : Interest calculation is slightly underestimated.

parallel-parallelizer/Savings.sol : Function decimals will return the wrong value when the asset has less than 18 decimals.

parallel-parallelizer/Savings.sol : Burnt initial deposit accrues unrecoverable interest.

parallel-parallelizer/LibOracle.sol : Oracles with hardcoded addresses will only work on Ethereum.

parallel-parallelizer/LibOracle.sol : Missing min/max answer checks on Chainlink price feeds.

parallel-parallelizer/LibOracle.sol : Circuit prices can have high errors.

parallel-parallelizer/LibOracle.sol : Missing checks for sequencer uptime on rollups.

parallel-parallelizer/Swapper.sol : Quote functions don't revert when trying to burn more stablecoins than allowed.

parallel-parallelizer/Swapper.sol : Missing whitelisted check for quoting functions.

parallel-parallelizer/Swapper.sol : First minter can put the protocol in an extreme exposure towards one collateral.

parallel-parallelizer/Swapper.sol : DOS on mints when using USDM or stETH as managed collateral.

parallel-parallelizer/Setters : Zero or negative fees enable arbitrage via oracle deviations.

parallel-parallelizer/Setters : Admin can drain the system.

parallel-parallelizer/Setters : Setting a collateral manager with existing funds causes a temporary collateral ratio drop.

parallel-parallelizer/Setters : Zero fees enable exposure manipulation across collaterals.

parallel-parallelizer/RewardHandler.sol : Function sellRewards will revert on Sonic due to hardcoded 1Inch router address.

parallel-parallelizer/RewardHandler.sol : Guardian can self-sandwich sellRewards to steal most of the rewards.

parallel-parallelizer/Redeemer.sol : Users might be forced into forfeiting a collateral

parallel-parallelizer/DiamondProxy.sol : The system doesn't support fee-on-transfer tokens.

parallel-parallelizer/MultiBlockHarvester.sol : Hardcoded addresses can break functionality on other chains.

parallel-parallelizer/MultiBlockHarvester.sol : DOS Risk during harvest when a stablecoin depegs.

parallel-parallelizer/GenericHarvester.sol : Harvesting will be DOSed while there are flashloan fees on TokenP

parallel-parallelizer/GenericHarvester.sol : Rebalance interference between harvester contracts.

parallel-parallelizer/BaseHarvester.sol : _computeRebalanceAmount doesn't completely rebalance the system.

parallel-tokens/BridgeableTokenP.sol : If feesRate=0 bridge can be done repeatedly to DOS swaps from LZ -> principal token.

parallel-tokens/BridgeableTokenP.sol : Fee rate changes can lead to unexpected number of received tokens.

parallel-tokens/BridgeableTokenP.sol : LZ messages can be received (causing tokens to be credited) even when the contract is paused. 

Codebase

Parallel V3 Modules, including Parallelizer, Flashloan & Savings Modules

Parallel V3 Modules

Parallel V3 Core

Parallel V3 Tokens

PRL Tokenomics

PRL Token

Documentation

Rewards are distributed according to the impact of the vulnerability based on the [Immunefi Vulnerability Severity Classification System V2.3](https://immunefi.com/immunefi-vulnerability-severity-classification-system-v2-3/). 

Reward Calculation for Critical Level Reports

For critical smart contract bugs, the reward amount is 10% of the funds directly affected up to a maximum of USD 250,000. The calculation of the amount of funds at risk is based on the time and date the bug report is submitted. However, a minimum reward of USD 50,000 is to be rewarded in order to incentivize security researchers against withholding a critical bug report.

For critical web/apps bugs, reports will be rewarded with USD $50,000, only if the impact leads to:

- A loss of funds involving an attack that does not require any user action
- Private key or private key generation leakage leading to unauthorized access to user funds 

All other impacts that would be classified as Critical would be rewarded a flat amount of $10,000. The rest of the severity levels are paid out according to the Impact in Scope table.  

__Repeatable Attack Limitations__

If the smart contract where the vulnerability exists can be upgraded or paused, only the initial attack will be considered for a reward. This is because the project can mitigate the risk of further exploitation by upgrading or pausing the component where the vulnerability exists. The reward amount will depend on the severity of the impact and the funds at risk. 

For critical repeatable attacks on smart contracts that cannot be upgraded or paused, the project will consider the cumulative impact of the repeatable attacks for a reward. This is because the project cannot prevent the attacker from repeatedly exploiting the vulnerability until all funds are drained and/or other irreversible damage is done. Therefore, this warrants a reward equivalent to 10% of funds at risk, capped at the maximum critical reward. 

__Reward Calculation for High Level Reports__

High vulnerabilities concerning theft/permanent freezing of unclaimed yield/royalties are rewarded within a range of $10,000 to $50,000 depending on the funds at risk, capped at the maximum high reward.  

In the event of temporary freezing, the reward doubles from the full frozen value for every additional 24h that the funds are temporarily frozen, up until a max cap of the high reward. This is because as the duration of the freezing lengthens, the potential for greater damage and subsequent reputational harm intensifies. Thus, by increasing the reward proportionally with the frozen duration, the project ensures stronger incentives for bug disclosure of this nature.

__Reward Payment Terms__

Payouts are handled by the Parallel team directly and are denominated in **USD**. However, payments are done in **USDp** on **Ethereum**.

The calculation of the net amount rewarded is based on the average price between CoinMarketCap.com and CoinGecko.com at the time the bug report was submitted. No adjustments are made based on liquidity availability.