Royco Dawn splits onchain yield into two tranches:
- Senior — Earns base yield with built-in protection. Losses are absorbed by Junior first.
- Junior — Earns higher yield in exchange for absorbing losses first.
Both tranches can withdraw at any time under normal conditions. No lockups.
PoC Required
KYC required
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Assets in Scope
Impacts in Scope
Whitelisting & Fund Recovery Context
Royco Dawn operates with a whitelisted architecture where certain trusted addresses and parties have privileged access to protocol functions. These whitelisted parties are assumed to act in good faith, and funds sent to whitelisted addresses (or addresses explicitly specified by whitelisted parties) are considered recoverable through administrative action or protocol upgrades.
In-Scope Impacts for Direct Theft Rewards:
For a vulnerability to qualify as a Direct Theft finding eligible for reward, it must demonstrate:
Permanent loss of (non-dust) user funds that cannot be remediated through a protocol upgrade or administrative action — Either through theft to non-whitelisted addresses (or addresses not intended by whitelisted parties), or through funds being permanently locked. This includes abuse of privileged roles beyond their intended permissions.
Direct theft of user funds
Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Permanent freezing of funds
Out of scope
Blockchain/DLT & Smart Contract Specific:
- Incorrect data supplied by third party oracles
- Not to exclude oracle manipulation/flash loan attacks
- Impacts requiring basic economic and governance attacks (e.g. 51% attack)
- Lack of liquidity impacts
- Impacts from Sybil attacks
- Impacts involving centralization risks
- Whitelisted/admin parties behaving maliciously (assumed trusted and funds recoverable)
- Incorrect amounts sent to whitelisted parties or their specified recipients (reversible)
- External protocol bugs
- Centralization risks
- MEV, gas griefing, frontrunning
- Frontend or off-chain components
Websites and Apps
- Theoretical impacts without any proof or demonstration
- Impacts involving attacks requiring physical access to the victim device
- Impacts involving attacks requiring access to the local network of the victim
- Reflected plain text injection (e.g. url parameters, path, etc.)
- This does not exclude reflected HTML injection with or without JavaScript
- This does not exclude persistent plain text injection
- Any impacts involving self-XSS
- Captcha bypass using OCR without impact demonstration
- CSRF with no state modifying security impact (e.g. logout CSRF)
- Impacts related to missing HTTP Security Headers (such as X-FRAME-OPTIONS) or cookie security flags (such as “httponly”) without demonstration of impact
- Server-side non-confidential information disclosure, such as IPs, server names, and most stack traces
- Impacts causing only the enumeration or confirmation of the existence of users or tenants
- Impacts caused by vulnerabilities requiring un-prompted, in-app user actions that are not part of the normal app workflows
- Lack of SSL/TLS best practices
- Impacts that only require DDoS
- UX and UI impacts that do not materially disrupt use of the platform
- Impacts primarily caused by browser/plugin defects
- Leakage of non sensitive API keys (e.g. Etherscan, Infura, Alchemy, etc.)
- Any vulnerability exploit requiring browser bugs for exploitation (e.g. CSP bypass)
- SPF/DMARC misconfigured records
- Missing HTTP Headers without demonstrated impact
- Automated scanner reports without demonstrated impact
- UI/UX best practice recommendations
- Non-future-proof NFT rendering
All categories
- Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
- Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
- Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
- Best practice recommendations
- Feature requests
- Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
- Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers