Templar’s goal is to allow anyone to borrow Bitcoin, or any asset, without trusting centralized institutions. Current BTC lending solutions require users to surrender their Bitcoin to a centralized custodian, like Coinbase, creating risks of seizure, censorship, and counterparty failure, like what happened with BlockFi and Celsius.
Triaged by Immunefi
PoC Required
KYC required
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Assets in Scope
Impacts in Scope
All markets deployed through the registry at v1.tmplr.near ,as documented in the Templar Deployments Guide (https://docs.templarfi.org/guide/deployments.html#markets) are considered in scope. Each market represents a unique asset pair of the form COLLATERAL → BORROW.
At the time of publication, there are two older markets currently registered — stnear-usdc.v1.tmplr.near and ibtc-usdc.v1.tmplr.near which share the same subset of core assets. However, these older markets are excluded from scope under this Program.
As new markets are added to the v1.tmplr.near registry, they will automatically be considered in scope, provided they are deployed under the registry contract and follow the standard Templar market architecture.
Manipulation of governance voting result deviating from voted outcome and resulting in a direct change from intended effect of original results
Direct theft of any user funds, whether at-rest or in-motion, other than unclaimed yield
Permanent freezing of funds
Protocol insolvency
Theft of unclaimed yield
Permanent freezing of unclaimed yield
Temporary freezing of funds
Smart contract unable to operate due to lack of token funds
Block stuffing
Griefing (e.g. no profit motive for an attacker, but damage to the users or the protocol)
Theft of gas
Unbounded gas consumption
Out of scope
Smart Contract specific
- Incorrect data supplied by third party oracles
- Not to exclude oracle manipulation/flash loan attacks
- Impacts requiring basic economic and governance attacks (e.g. 51% attack)
- Lack of liquidity impacts
- Impacts from Sybil attacks
- Impacts involving centralization risks
All categories
- Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
- Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
- Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
- Best practice recommendations
- Feature requests
- Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
- Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers