Shardeum is an EVM-based, linearly scalable network offering low gas fees forever while maintaining true decentralization and (hopefully) solid security. Shardeum is a large project and as such, will be split over two concurrent boosts. This boost, called Ancillaries III, will cover the Web2 aspects of the project. This will cover four components: The validator GUI, validator CLI, Archive Server, and the RPC server. For more information about Shardeum, please visit https://shardeum.org/
Live
Triaged by Immunefi
PoC required
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Assets in Scope
Impacts in Scope
Proof of Concept (PoC) Requirements
POCs should be tested against the most recent changes on the /tree/dev github repo.
A PoC, demonstrating the bug's impact, is required for this program and has to comply with the Immunefi PoC Guidelines and Rules.
Which parts of the code are you most concerned about? Communication between the archiver and validators Communication between the RPC and the validators The GUI
What attack vectors are you most concerned about? Priv escalation from the GUI Crashing archivers Priv escalation in archivers. Archivers will not be public at launch Priv escalation in RPC Loss of data integrity on archive/RPC servers Ex: changing receipts Which part(s) of the system do you want whitehats to attempt to break the most? Archiver and RPC server. We want them to break all of it obviously but we believe these two components need more attention
What external dependencies are there?
Things listed in package.json
Where might Security Researchers confuse out-of-scope code to be in-scope?
The default config in the branch is in scope. Whitehats are free to configure, patch, and modify their own malicious hosts however they want. However, target service must be running the default config in the target branch running in production mode. Vulns involving a service attacking itself are not in scope. This is to prevent the whitehats from wasting time reporting things we specifically allow in debug mode. If the researchers can enable debug mode options remotely then that is valid and can be paid out. Attacks that require the attacker to own an archive server will have their severity reduced to insight by default, but may be raised at the project’s discretion. Attacks that require the network to still be initializing/bootstrapping are out of scope. Wait until the network mode reaches “processing” + 15 cycles after startup before launching attacks. The rules for staking/join are a little different and the network will not be public during this time. Attacks on a network that is repairing itself (was once in “processing” mode but has since degraded to “safety” or “recovery”) are in scope. Attacks that require lots of network traffic, large messages, or many connections will be given an severity of “insight”. The project may increase this at our discretion. 0day vulnerabilities in dependencies will have a max impact of insight. Any other vuln in dependencies is out of scope. Any report based on unit tests, simulations, or anything not a fully functioning service, will have a max impact of low. Smart contracts and smart contract related code/functions are out of scope Finally, the more nodes that are required to launch an attack, the more at risk the vuln is of being downgraded. If it takes 33% (for example) of the nodes in the network being malicious to cause damage, then it becomes difficult to distinguish the impact from a brute-force/51% attack, which is completely out of scope.
Are there any unusual points about your protocol that may confuse Security Researchers?
The archive server is designed to store the history of the network. Archivers are not a part of the core protocol, do not have any part in consensus, and do not affect joining/rotation. Another quirk is that currently, the transaction history is not chained. The cycle certificates are chained which contains information like joined and lost nodes per cycle, active nodes, archiver list, standby list, etc. The transaction history will have a Merkle root published while the chaining is developed.
Execute arbitrary system commands
Retrieve sensitive data/files from a running server, such as:
- /etc/shadow
- database passwords
- blockchain keys (this does not include non-sensitive environment variables, open source code, or usernames)
Taking and/modifying authenticated actions (with or without blockchain state interaction) on behalf of other users without any interaction by that user, such as:
- Changing registration information
- Commenting
- Voting
- Making trades
- Withdrawals, etc.
Direct theft of user funds
Malicious interactions with an already-connected wallet, such as:
- Modifying transaction arguments or parameters
- Substituting contract addresses
- Submitting malicious transactions
Injecting/modifying the static content on the target application without JavaScript (persistent), such as:
- HTML injection without JavaScript
- Replacing existing text with arbitrary text
- Arbitrary file uploads, etc.
Changing sensitive details of other users (including modifying browser local storage) without already-connected wallet interaction and with up to one click of user interaction, such as:
- Password of the victim etc.
Improperly disclosing confidential user information, such as:
- Email address
- Phone number
- Physical address, etc.
Taking down the application/website
Changing non-sensitive details of other users (including modifying browser local storage) without already-connected wallet interaction and with up to one click of user interaction, such as:
- Changing the first/last name of user
- Enabling/disabling notifications
Injecting/modifying the static content on the target application without JavaScript (reflected), such as:
- Reflected HTML Injection
- Loading external site data
Redirecting users to malicious websites (open redirect)
Out of scope
Bug reports covering previously-discovered bugs (listed below) are not eligible for a reward within this program. This includes known issues that the project is aware of but has consciously decided not to “fix”, necessary code changes, or any implemented operational mitigating procedures that can lessen potential risk. Bugs from previous bounties are in scope unless explicitly said otherwise. Reports 33428, 33655, 33963, 34508, 33576, 34053, 36024, 36025, 36025 are OOS.
https://reports.immunefi.com/shardeum-ancillaries
https://reports.immunefi.com/shardeum-ancillaries-ii
Other Known issues
-
AJV Validation error on archiver can cause missing receipts https://github.com/shardeum/archiver/blob/bugbounty/src/Data/Collector.ts#L280
-
getTxTimestampBinary endpoint could be used as a memory overflow mechanism https://github.com/shardeum/core/blob/9dae0abe5232ed532a9285da82118b41a04b3711/src/state-manager/TransactionConsensus.ts#L1796
-
SQL injection in inputs at https://github.com/shardeum/shardeum/blob/dev/src/storage/sqlite3storage.ts#L257-L289
-
Tx data : ( ORIGINAL_TX_DATA) getting saved in originalTxData, processedData and transaction table without any verification https://github.com/shardeum/archiver/blob/cbe1d515e91058d17fa483f84361992cd3d1cf9c/src/archivedCycle/StateMetaData.ts#L156
Web & App specific
- Theoretical impacts without any proof or demonstration
- Impacts involving attacks requiring physical access to the victim device
- Impacts involving attacks requiring access to the local network of the victim
- Reflected plain text injection (e.g. url parameters, path, etc.)
- This does not exclude reflected HTML injection with or without JavaScript
- This does not exclude persistent plain text injection
- Any impacts involving self-XSS
- Captcha bypass using OCR without impact demonstration
- CSRF with no state modifying security impact (e.g. logout CSRF)
- Impacts related to missing HTTP Security Headers (such as X-FRAME-OPTIONS) or cookie security flags (such as “httponly”) without demonstration of impact
- Server-side non-confidential information disclosure, such as IPs, server names, and most stack traces
- Impacts causing only the enumeration or confirmation of the existence of users or tenants
- Impacts caused by vulnerabilities requiring un-prompted, in-app user actions that are not part of the normal app workflows
- Lack of SSL/TLS best practices
- Impacts that only require DDoS
- UX and UI impacts that do not materially disrupt use of the platform
- Impacts primarily caused by browser/plugin defects
- Leakage of non sensitive API keys (e.g. Etherscan, Infura, Alchemy, etc.)
- Any vulnerability exploit requiring browser bugs for exploitation (e.g. CSP bypass)
- SPF/DMARC misconfigured records)
- Missing HTTP Headers without demonstrated impact
- Automated scanner reports without demonstrated impact
- UI/UX best practice recommendations
- Non-future-proof NFT rendering
All categories
- Impacts requiring attacks that the reporter has already exploited themselves, leading to damage
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to leaked keys/credentials
- Impacts caused by attacks requiring access to privileged addresses (including, but not limited to: governance and strategist contracts) without additional modifications to the privileges attributed
- Impacts relying on attacks involving the depegging of an external stablecoin where the attacker does not directly cause the depegging due to a bug in code
- Mentions of secrets, access tokens, API keys, private keys, etc. in Github will be considered out of scope without proof that they are in-use in production
- Best practice recommendations
- Feature requests
- Impacts on test files and configuration files unless stated otherwise in the bug bounty program
- Impacts requiring phishing or other social engineering attacks against project's employees and/or customers